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Abstract 
With 2005 recording the best economic performance in the past decade, continued 
growth in 2006, and only a moderate slowdown likely in 2007, Japan finally is escaping 
its mediocre performance trap. The economy is moving reasonably well from recovery to 
full employment and sustained growth. GDP grew 3.2 percent in fiscal 2005, ending 
March 2006. The consensus is that growth will probably be at least 2.5 percent in fiscal 
2006, and then slow to a slightly better than 2 percent rate in fiscal 2007. I am more 
optimistic about the Japanese economy than I have been for fifteen years, though that is 
not saying much. However, concerns persist: the economy has not yet returned to full 
employment growth, deflation has not quite ended, considerable employment slack 
remains, and the surprisingly low annualized growth rate of 1.0 percent for the April–
June 2006 quarter is a splash of cold water, though it is less bad than it seems. I think 
domestic demand-side challenges will continue to dominate well into 2007, and perhaps 
beyond.  
Near-term uncertainties are greater than usual. One major near-term uncertainty in 
early autumn 2006 is political. In succeeding sections I address Japan’s recent economic 
performance; near-term prospects; government economic policy, with special focus on 
the monetary and fiscal policy components of macroeconomic policy; increasing income 
inequality; the financial sector; corporate management and governance; Japan in the 
global economy; and implications of economic maturity and declining population in the 
long run. I end with brief concluding comments. 
Major international concerns include the future price of oil; slowing growth of the 
United States economy; incipient global inflationary pressures; the global trade imbalances 
centering on the huge and increasing U.S. trade and current account deficits and Chinese 
surpluses; and the implications for the yen-dollar rate. A different type of concern is that 
Japan’s current economic success will generate complacency among public and private 
decision-makers such that still-needed public and private sector reforms are not fully carried 
out. Despite these concerns, I anticipate that Japan will indeed achieve sustained growth with 
full employment over the course of the next two to three years.
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With 2005 recording the best economic performance in the past decade, continued 
growth in 2006, and only a moderate slowdown likely in 2007, Japan finally is escaping 
its mediocre performance trap. The economy is moving reasonably well from recovery to 
full employment and sustained growth. GDP grew 3.2 percent in fiscal 2005, ending 
March 2006. The consensus is that growth will probably be at least 2.5 percent in fiscal 
2006, and then slow to a slightly better than 2 percent rate in fiscal 2007. 
The highly regarded Bank of Japan (BoJ) Tankan quarterly survey at June end 
indicates business expectations support the widespread optimism permeating Japan. In 
response to these better economic conditions, the BoJ terminated its five-year zero interest 
rate policy on July 14, a major shift in monetary policy. 
I am more optimistic about the Japanese economy than I have been for fifteen years, 
though that is not saying much. But concerns persist: the economy has not yet returned to full 
employment growth, deflation has not quite ended, considerable employment slack remains, 
and the surprisingly low annualized growth rate of 1.0 percent for the April–June 2006 
quarter is a splash of cold water, though it is less bad than it seems. I think domestic demand-
side challenges will continue to dominate well into 2007, and perhaps beyond.  
Near-term uncertainties are greater than usual. One major near-term uncertainty in 
early autumn 2006 is political. As expected, Shinzo Abe was elected President of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) on September 20 and Prime Minister on September 26, replacing 
Junichiro Koizumi. The Abe administration rhetoric on economic policy has been good but it 
remains to be seen how fully and well policy proposals, still rather general, will be 
implemented. A further concern is that the recently released monthly economic performance 
indicators for summer 2006 are mixed, and not great.  
Major international concerns include the future price of oil; slowing growth of the 
United States economy; incipient global inflationary pressures; the global trade imbalances 
centering on the huge and increasing U.S. trade and current account deficits and Chinese 
surpluses; and the implications for the yen-dollar rate. A different type of concern is that 
Japan’s current economic success will generate complacency among public and private 
decision-makers such that still-needed public and private sector reforms are not fully carried 
out. 
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Despite these concerns, I anticipate that Japan will indeed achieve sustained growth 
with full employment over the course of the next two to three years. 
Subsequent sections address Japan’s recent economic performance; near-term 
prospects; government economic policy, with special focus on the monetary and fiscal 
policy components of macroeconomic policy; increasing income inequality; the financial 
sector; corporate management and governance; Japan in the global economy; and 
implications of economic maturity and declining population in the long run. I end with 
brief concluding comments. 
 
 
1 Recent Economic Performance 
 
For three decades, Japan has had a structural problem of deficient domestic private 
aggregate demand. In macroeconomic terms, Japan’s high private saving rate was 
significantly greater than its high private business investment rate, and the gap was too 
large to be absorbed by an export and current account surplus. This was exacerbated over 
the past fifteen years, necessitating huge government deficit spending to prevent a serious 
recession. However, the private sector saving-investment gap has decreased significantly, 
and so will be much less of a problem. The household gross saving rate, some 15 percent 
of GDP in 1991 and 11.6 percent in 1998, declined to 6.0 percent in 2004 and even lower 
in 2005. This was due in large part to the increase in the elderly population and to a 
widespread desire to maintain consumption levels. While corporate saving rates have 
risen, now that balance sheet health has been restored, companies are prepared to invest 
more rather than paying down debt.  
 Excellent growth in fiscal 2005 was driven by consumption expenditures, 
business investment, and exports. Consumption increased 2.4 percent, substantially better 
than any year since 1996, and provided half of domestic demand growth. Business fixed 
investment rose 7.5 percent, providing another two-fifths of growth. Exports rose 9.2 
percent; however, imports rose 6.8 percent in real terms, and even more in current prices, 
so net external demand was only one-sixth of real GDP growth. After several negative 
years, government demand in fiscal 2005 temporarily rose slightly, comprising 0.2 
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percentage points of the 3.2 percent GDP growth; this was mainly due to the substantial 
slowing of the decrease in government public works investment of previous years. 
Despite the erratic and somewhat unreliable monthly movements of many 
economic indicators, on a quarterly basis they demonstrate that the recovery has been 
strong and broad-based, and is continuing to move into expansion mode. The economy 
started 2006 with a continuation of good growth, at a 2.7 percent clip (seasonally adjusted 
annual rate). While more mixed indicators led the consensus of experts to expect some 
slowdown to a 1.8 percent rate in the April–June quarter, the government’s first 
preliminary estimate on August 11 was only a disappointing 0.8 percent. The second 
preliminary estimate, released on September 11, inched the annual GDP growth rate 
estimate up to 1.0 percent, but the substance was basically unchanged. The good news 
was that domestic private demand—consumption and business investment—continued to 
grow well, at a 2.9 percent rate. Moreover, the slowdown was due predominantly to a 
decline in inventories and in government spending, which in fact is not bad news.  
Importantly, national average land prices rose by 0.9 percent in 2005, the first 
increase since 1992. While in some prefectures land prices are still falling, though more 
slowly, they are rising in major cities, notably Tokyo. Bank lending has turned positive, 
and increased notably in July. Industrial production and exports continue to rise, and 
services are growing reasonably well. The sharp decline in July in core machinery orders 
is worrisome, only partially offset by an increase in August. Hopefully this is only a 
temporary aberration. 
The private sector is an ever-more important driver of the economy. The 
corporate sector has resurged. Successful restructuring has reduced costs, worker 
productivity has continued to increase and unit labor costs to decrease; even without price 
increases, profits rose by an impressive 12.5 percent in 2005 for larger firms, and 10.4 
percent for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
 While not yet satisfactory, labor markets are improving. Unemployment, 4.1 
percent in August, continues its slow decrease. The quality of employment has turned 
around. The number of full-time workers has begun to rise, and the still-too-high share of 
part-time workers and contract workers has leveled off at about a third of employees. 
However, persisting labor slack is evidenced in the reality that compensation of 
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employees, based on rises in regular employees of 0.5 percent and in earnings of 0.7 
percent, increased only 1.3 percent in 2005 and is not yet rising significantly. The 
summer 2006 wage bonus for some 800 large firms rose 1.79 percent, only 239 yen (0.08 
percentage points) more than summer 2005. 
 
 
2 Near Term Prospects 
 
The data now available, and the various private forecasts, suggest that the July-September 
quarter performance will be somewhat better than the weak previous quarter, but not 
strong enough to fully alleviate concerns about slowdown. Nonetheless, the September – 
end Tankan of business sentiments and expectations was once again strong, more than 
expected, which suggests recovery and growth will be sustained. The first preliminary 
estimates of July – September GDP growth will be announced on November 14; that will 
provide a better sense of how the economy is doing. 
 The Economist consensus of foreign financial institutions as of early October is 
that real GDP will grow 2.8 percent in 2006, with a 2.6 – 3.0 range and 2.1 percent in 
2007, with a 1.6 – 3.1 range. Consumer prices are forecast to increase 0.3 percent in 2006 
and 0.5 percent in 2007. Since estimates of the longer-run potential growth are 1.5–2 
percent, this is good news. The government, Bank of Japan, IMF and OECD forecasts 
tend to be more cautious but are nonetheless good. Growth depends on the demand side 
on how rapidly consumption increases, as well as business fixed investment and exports; 
and on the supply side the degree of slack in the economy, especially labor slack, and 
relatedly, the size of the output gap. 
 
 
2.1 Labor Slack 
 
Japan’s labor force as of spring 2006 totaled 67.25 million, of whom 64.84 million have 
jobs. Labor slack is still substantial. Of the 50.0 million employees (excluding corporate 
executives), 16.6 million (33.2 percent) are not regular employees. This includes 7.8 
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million part-time workers (of whom 7 million are women), 3.4 million temporary 
workers, and 5.4 million contract or dispatched workers. Full-time employees have 
decreased by 5 percent since 2000, while part-time and others have risen by 25 percent.  
The labor slack includes unemployed seeking jobs, those who have reluctantly 
withdrawn from the labor force, the many part-timers who desire regular full-time jobs, 
and many of those who reluctantly accepted early retirement, as well as the elderly who 
would like at least part-time employment. It is important to distinguish between those 
who work part time by choice, predominantly married women, and those, especially 
temporary workers, who cannot obtain satisfactory full-time employment. 
 Some of the greatest costs of Japan’s mediocre economic performance over the 
past fifteen years have been inflicted on young Japanese. They have disproportionately 
been unemployed or underemployed in part-time work. They are not receiving adequate 
on-the-job training. Many have stopped actively seeking work, or have dropped out of the 
labor market. Although some have deliberately chosen alternative life styles, most seek 
full-time work in a suitable occupation. New terms have entered the language: freeters 
(part-time and temporary workers), NEETs (those not in education, employment, or 
training). As of 2005, of those aged 15 to 34, 2,132,000 were unemployed (including 
about 640,000 NEETs), and another 2,010,000 were freeters, including many high school 
dropouts. Most NEETs come from poor families and have low educational attainment. 
 Sustained economic growth, creating demand for workers, is the solution. While 
we do not know just how young people will respond to better job opportunities, I 
consider this potential labor supply to be the major resource to sustain rapid growth for 
another two years at least. However, some 60 percent of the freeters and NEETs are 25 or 
older; rigid recruiting age norms are an obstacle to their obtaining regular fulltime jobs. 
They probably will not be absorbed until labor markets become quite tight. 
 Some 19.4 percent of Japanese 65 or over are employed. This is higher than in 
other countries, though the rate has decreased over the past 15 years. Many baby boomers 
retiring from full-time, regular jobs will seek continued employment. How large a labor 
reservoir older people are is unclear. 
 Japan’s traditional large-firm permanent employment system has not disappeared, 
but it has become more narrowly defined. Many companies impose a hierarchy of job 
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categories: permanent regular full-time employees (the core), essentially permanent part-
time workers (mostly women), contract employees (one year or so), workers temporarily 
dispatched from another firm, ordinary part-time workers, temporary part-time workers 
(often on specific projects), and casual day laborers. Most of these categories are mainly 
for blue collar or clerical work. Management-track employees are key members of the 
core. The weak labor market of the past fifteen years has enabled firms to shift more 
flexibly to lower-wage categories.  
There are grounds for optimism that full-time employment will increase and that 
unemployment and part-time employment will decline significantly. This is because GDP 
will grow faster than 2 percent for the next two years and because the surge of early 
postwar baby boomers will begin to retire from 2007. With labor markets tightening as 
labor slack evaporates, wages eventually will have to rise. Better employment and higher 
wages will accordingly generate higher household consumption, an essential ingredient to 




2.2 The Output Gap 
 
Two major objectives of economic policy are simultaneously to achieve and maintain 
both full-employment potential growth and price stability. In any forecasts, the size of the 
output gap—the amount of slack in the economy—is a key factor in estimating growth. 
The gap between actual output (GDP) and potential output under conditions of full 
employment of resources and price stability may be conceptually clear, but empirically it 
is difficult to measure, especially in an advanced economy where services rather than 
goods comprise most of the output. As Japan demonstrates, this empirical difficulty is 
exacerbated when an economy undergoes a long period of below-potential growth 
combined with modest deflation. The size of the output gap depends on the amount of 
slack in the economy, as well as future employment, capacity utilization, and labor 
productivity growth. 
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 I share the view that the estimates of the output gap made by the government and 
the BoJ have been too small, and that slack in the economy is still substantial. Part has to 
do with the estimates of long-run potential growth, which are too cautious. Part has to do 
with the difficulties in measuring capacity (and, indeed, output) in services, now more 
than three-quarters of GDP. Even with good growth, slack will exist so long as prices are 
not increasing, wage rises are small, and unemployment and underemployment persist. 
Improvements in these indicators, rather than direct estimates of the presumed output 
gap, will tell us when the economy is back to normal. 
An additional uncertainty is the degree to which labor productivity will grow, due 
not only to public and private sector reforms and restructuring but, more fundamentally, 
to the rate of technological progress. Japan has the potential to increase its rate of 
productivity growth from technological change and its diffusion as well as from increased 
efficiency in the allocation and utilization of labor and capital. Total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth slowed to 0.45 percent between 1995 and 2003, far below the 1980–1990 
rate of 1.25 percent. This occurred despite the rise in capital investment in, output of, and 
TFP in information technology (IT) industries. The spread of IT to non-IT sectors has 






While real economic performance will probably continue to do reasonably well, still 
being debated in Japan is whether deflation has finally come to an end. Obviously, much 
depends on how deflation is defined. The core CPI based on 2000 prices maintained very 
small positive monthly increases from November 2005, and in June continued at a 0.6 
percent annual rate after the 0.5 percent rate for the first four months of the year. That 
was sufficient to persuade the BoJ that ending its zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) was 
appropriate and desirable. 
 The August 25 revision of the CPI index to a 2005 price benchmark is another 
splash of cold water. The downward revision of the new core CPI was 0.4 percent for 
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July and 0.5 percent for the January–July period, substantially larger than expected. 
Accordingly, the July core CPI increased only 0.2 percent, and basically only became 
positive in June 2006, unlike the 2000 measure, which had become positive in November 
2005. This will certainly reduce forecasts for the core CPI for this year and 2007. 
 I am concerned both that deflation has not yet completely ended and that price 
stability will be fragile. The dangers of deflation outweigh inflation, and their costs are 
disproportionately large. Financial markets evidently have a similar view, as indicated by 
the still-low yields on Japanese government bonds (JGBs). As of October 11, the yield on 
ten-year JGBs was 1.74 percent. The yield was 2.23 percent on twenty-year JGBs, and 
2.51 percent on thirty-year. These suggest an expectation that price stability will continue 
with the CPI near the Bank of Japan’s zero lower bound. 
 
 
3 Government Economic Policy 
 
Prime Minister Abe, his economic policy team, and the LDP face a host of economic 
policy issues. Abe’s initial statements regarding his economic policy intentions are 
straightforward and good. They represent basically a continuation of Koizumi’s policies 
but with somewhat different emphases and nuances. The focus is on growth of 3 percent 
in nominal GDP, combined with continued government expenditure tightness. Increased 
tax revenues thus will be the means of government budget deficit reduction, rather than 
an early increase in the consumption tax. In principle, Abe will preserve and implement 
the reform agenda of regulation and privatization. He has outlined a longer-term 
economic growth strategy focusing on innovation, technology, and productivity; 
educational reform; and a more flexible economic system to provide losers a second 
chance (whatever that means). How rapid nominal growth will be achieved in the near 
term is not at all clear. 
The key will be the nature and degree of policy implementation. It is unclear how 
strongly Abe will exercise leadership in carrying out economic policies and how effective 
the results will be. He apparently is concentrating economic policy power in the Prime 
Minister’s office. Will the reconstituted Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, even 
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with its strong private sector members, once again become a powerful economic policy-
making institution? In what ways will there be political support in the Diet for still-
needed reforms? How about the still-powerful central government bureaucracy, which 
opposes reforms reducing its power? In what ways will the policy agenda be shaped by 
the summer 2007 Upper House elections, in which LDP control is at risk? Agricultural 
sector reform is essential to implement any foreign trade initiative. How likely is that? 
Together with reduction of protectionist regulation, the government appropriately 
has enacted prudential, pro-market regulation to enhance market transparency, efficiency, 
and competitiveness. However, Japan still has a long way to go on deregulation and 
liberalization, even apart from agriculture. 
Prime Minister Abe, his Cabinet, and his economic advisors will need to make 
their own strong commitment to sustain and enhance economic reform measures in order 
to provide the government policy foundation for sustained growth. While the coming 
year will be good economically, it will be unsettled politically. Given the current political 
and government bureaucrat backlash against Koizumi’s free market agenda, there is a 
real danger the government’s economic reform program will slow substantially. 
Prime Minister Abe’s most dramatic and indeed welcome action has been to 
quickly begin the process of repairing political relations with China and South Korea by 
his weekend trip to Beijing on October 7 to meet with President Hu Jintao, and then to 
Seoul on October 8 to meet with President Roh Moo-Hyun. Those meetings, desired by 
all three leaders, were constructive, and presumably will put Japan on a better path in its 
relations with them. Of course, the situation has been made considerably more 
complicated by North Korea’s announcement of its nuclear bomb test on October 9. 
 
 
3.1 Fiscal Policy 
 
Reducing the still-huge budget deficit and restoring fiscal balance continues to be a top 
priority under the Abe administration. Key issues are how rapidly to reduce the deficit, 
the relative contribution of expenditure cuts and tax revenue increases, what kinds of 
taxes to raise, and by how much. Koizumi’s final package of economic and fiscal-policy 
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guidelines for fiscal 2007- 2011 was finalized in July and approved by the Cabinet, and 
apparently has been accepted by Abe, not surprising since he was directly involved. 
 Although fiscal stimulus was essential in the 1990s in order to maintain aggregate 
demand sufficient to prevent a crisis or serious recession, the government budget deficit 
became enormous, and government debt ballooned. With recovery beginning in 2002, the 
government has been able to pursue an appropriately moderate fiscal tightening policy, 
on the order of 0.5 percent of GDP a year. The combined budget deficit for both central 
and local governments, 8.0 percent of GDP in 2002, has declined to 6.0 percent in 2005 
and a projected 5.2 percent in 2006. With the economy now well along its recovery path, 
the fiscal 2006 budget deficit may actually be somewhat smaller as revenues increase 
beyond official cautious projections.  
 An ongoing debate in the LDP has been whether to give priority to expenditure 
cuts or to consumption tax increases. That has been resolved in favor of the former by the 
Abe administration, coupled with the new goal of substantial nominal growth. Koizumi’s 
fiscal priority was first to restrain and then to reduce expenditures, as the fiscal 2006 
budget proposals demonstrate. Flat expenditures combined with revenue growth since 
2004 have reduced the deficit absolutely as well as a share of GDP. With good growth 
performance, government revenues have been rising significantly. The government 
terminated its 1999 income tax cuts, instituted small annual (but cumulatively important) 
increases in social security taxes on wages, and is increasing private co-payments for the 
government national health care program.  
 On July 21, guidelines were announced for the fiscal 2007 budget. Central 
government general-account expenditures are to be ¥46.8 trillion, below ¥47 trillion for 
the first time in nine years. Expenditure cuts are not across the board as before, but 
instead range from 1 percent to 3 percent. Public works and official development 
assistance (foreign aid) are cut 3 percent, defense by 1 percent. 
The government’s five-year target is to return to budget primary balance by 2011, 
meaning that the budget deficit excluding government interest payments on its net debt 
will be zero. By the end of fiscal 2006 the primary deficit, 5.7 percent of GDP in 2002, is 
projected to be 2.8 percent. The long-run goal is to run a primary surplus by 2015 
sufficient to achieve a balanced or even surplus government budget. These projections 
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are founded on important assumptions, particularly that private aggregate demand will be 
sufficient to sustain the potential growth rate, both nominal and real. 
To achieve primary balance by 2011, the government will have to overcome a 
projected five-year budget shortfall of ¥16.5 trillion. In July the Cabinet adopted 
guidelines that require most (between 69 percent and 86 percent) to be covered by 
reductions in expenditures, and the remainder by tax increases. These projections are 
based on the assumptions that current-price GDP growth will average 3 percent, and real 
growth 2.2 percent. Implicit is the expectation that economic reforms and total factor 
productivity increases, plus absorption of remaining slack, will generate this growth. 
 The projected expenditure cut targets are unlikely to be fully achieved. The 
summer 2007 Upper House election puts great pressure on the LDP to halt the large 
declines in government local public works projects, and to increase transfers to local 
governments. In the longer run, public pension payments will increase as the population 
ages. Importantly, Japan’s defense share of the costs of the planned relocation of U.S. 
military forces in Okinawa is ¥1.9 trillion spread over eight years, and is not in the 
proposed budgets. The longer-run fiscal wild card is national security: will the North 
Korean nuclear and missile threat and other security concerns lead to significantly 
increased defense expenditures? 
 Cuts in government expenditures and rises in revenues have significantly altered 
the nature of the ongoing tax policy debate. The main issue is the consumption tax, 
currently 5 percent. A rise of 1 percentage point in the consumption tax increases 
government revenues (and reduces aggregate demand) about 0.5 percent of GDP. In 2005 
the debate was whether to raise the tax 5 or 10 percentage points and whether to start in 
fiscal 2007. Now the starting date is no sooner than 2008, more likely 2009, and possibly 
not until 2010. And the question is whether the long-term increase should be 1 to 2 
percentage points or 5 percentage points. The risk of premature fiscal tightening is 
currently considerably lower than before. I expect that the government will need to raise 
the consumption tax at some point. When and by how much depends on real and current 




3.2 Monetary Policy 
 
The Bank of Japan dramatically altered macroeconomic policy, beginning in March, by 
shifting from a policy of extraordinary monetary ease to one of still considerable ease. 
The BoJ thereby began the process of implementing the three sequential policy steps 
essential to restore a normal monetary policy. These are: (1) reversing its quantitative 
easing policy by withdrawing excess liquidity in the system; (2) terminating the zero 
interest rate policy (ZIRP); and (3) gradually raising interest rates to a neutral level once 
sustained, full-employment growth consistent with price stability is achieved. The first 
two steps have been taken. The key policy issue now is how frequently and how far the 
BoJ will raise interest rates over the next year or two. 
 The BoJ also adopted a new monetary policy framework, which embodies 
transparent and flexible perspectives. It provides the Monetary Policy Board’s 
“understanding” of price stability in the medium to longer term as being a CPI range of 0 
percent to 2 percent. This provides an anchor for price expectations. 
The new framework also is more forward looking. That is, policy will depend 
more on expected CPI and economic performance movements than on actual data, which 
in practice are backward looking. A potential danger of a forward-looking approach is 
that it may ignore the legacy effects of past poor economic growth and modest deflation. 
Effective BoJ communication, which Governor Toshihiko Fukui has done extremely 
well, will be even more important in implementing the new framework. 
 The BoJ successfully removed from the system most of the ¥24 trillion in excess 
reserves generated by the quantitative easing policy. That was necessary before it could 
restore its main policy instrument, namely changes in short-term interest rates. On the 
whole, the termination of quantitative easing has been accomplished quite smoothly, 
simply by letting BoJ holdings of short-term government debt run off. Excess reserve 
reduction alone was not sufficient to end ZIRP. For that, economic conditions and the 
CPI both had to be improving sufficiently and be expected to continue to improve. 
 On July 14 the BoJ ended ZIRP, as was widely expected. It raised the overnight 
call rate from 0 to 0.25 percent, and the basic lending rate at which banks can readily 
borrow from the BoJ (the “Lombard rate”) from 0.1 percent to 0.4 percent. Further, it 
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stated that an “accommodating monetary environment ensuing from very low interest 
rates will probably be maintained for some time.” The ending of ZIRP and restoring of 
interest rate policy flexibility was an important signal affecting expectations. Of course, 
the direct interest rate effect on borrowers, lenders, and depositors has been small. 
For optimal macroeconomic results, fiscal and monetary policies have to operate 
in tandem. For the next decade or so, fiscal policy will continue to focus on budget 
consolidation. This means a moderate fiscal drag on aggregate demand will persist. Fiscal 
policy is implemented through budget policy. That is inherently a political process 
involving Diet decisions on the mix of government expenditure reductions and tax 
increases. The BoJ has to accept this contractionary fiscal policy as a given, and adjust 
monetary policy so as to achieve adequate levels of aggregate demand consistent with 
price stability. The future will be a mix of relatively tight fiscal policy and relatively easy 
monetary policy. 
 The key policy objective of the Bank of Japan, as with all central banks, is price 
stability. The definition of price stability is just as important as its measurement. Price 
stability is not a single point on a price index (or weighted average of different price 
indices), but a range. Given imperfect data, imperfect knowledge of the future, and 
inevitable random economic shocks, this is appropriate. As in other advanced countries, 
the BoJ essentially measures price stability by consumer prices. The BoJ has been using 
as its primary measure of price stability the core Consumer Price Index (CPI), which 
excludes fresh foods. Unlike the United States and many other countries, Japan’s core 
CPI does not exclude energy. 
 The BoJ Monetary Policy Board now defines price stability as a range of 0–2 
percent increase in the overall CPI, referred to as “headline CPI,” lower than the U.S. Fed 
and European Central Bank, which both have an implicit range of 1–3 percent. The 
differences apparently lie in different perceptions of the degree of upward bias in the CPI 
measurement and of the safety buffer needed for the lower bound. It is generally accepted 
that the CPI inadequately handles technology-driven quality improvements, business 
price discounting practices, and lags in data, despite the improvement of using a hedonic 
price index to adjust quality for some items. In addition, there are technical debates on 
the best price index formula, as well as inevitable measurement errors. The general view 
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is that in the United States the CPI has an annual upward bias of up to 1 percent. The 
Federal Reserve Board’s implicit lower bound for price stability is a 1 percent rise in the 
core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) measure it uses. My guess is that Japan’s 
core CPI has an upward bias of at least 0.5 percent, even following the August 25 
revision. 
All this makes the BoJ March statement that the Japanese consumer price index 
has no significant bias astounding. So too is its assertion that, in light of BoJ flexibility 
and macroeconomic policy effectiveness, it does not need a safety margin for its lower 
bound to act as a buffer against the risk of declining prices. Given measurement 
uncertainties and random shocks, it is risky for the BoJ to accept 0 percent as a lower 
bound for policy guidance. I would like the BoJ to adopt a 1–3 percent CPI increase as its 
measure of price stability, more like other central banks. 
The BoJ monetary policy framework is in transition. I expect it to evolve as 
relevant conceptual issues are further analyzed and new empirical evidence becomes 
available. The BoJ has stated it will review its understanding of price stability every year 
in light of the structural changes in the economy. I do not expect the BoJ to adopt explicit 
inflation targeting any time soon, but I expect that at some point it will move its 
“understanding” of price stability to a 1–3 percent range, with 2 percent as the desired 
midpoint. 
 Other price measures are also relevant. The most important is the GDP deflator, 
which measures whether prices for total output are rising or falling. It is now 10 percent 
below the 1997 level, having declined every year; accordingly, current-price (nominal) 
GDP has been below real GDP. Many forecast the GDP deflator will flatten out and turn 
positive next year. To achieve the government’s 3 percent nominal growth target, it will 
have to. 
The most important monetary policy issue now is the course of further interest 
rate increases. The BoJ has stressed that it will pragmatically and flexibly respond to 
economic conditions, including price movements, as they develop. It also depends on the 
course of government fiscal and other economic policies. The Monetary Policy Board’s 
semi-annual forecasts of GDP growth and CPI movements will be announced on October 
31; that will provide some insight into the policy thinking of the members. 
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An intense debate is going on between hawkish and dovish commentators on how 
soon, how rapidly, and how steadily the BoJ will raise interest rates. It rests on different 
interpretations of BoJ statements, as well as its past behavior. Obviously a great deal 
depends on how the economy performs and whether deflation has indeed been brought to 
an end. The BoJ evidently does not expect a significant resurgence of deflation, 
presumably defined as several months of negative changes in the core CPI. 
 I consider the ongoing implementation of these three steps of monetary restraint 
more a lessening of the previous extraordinarily easy monetary policy than a tightening. 
Future BoJ policy should continue on this path, without premature tightening, until 
sustained, full employment growth and a comfortable degree of price stability are 
achieved. The recently revised CPI index suggests that the BoJ should not raise interest 
rates very soon. 
 
 
4 Increasing Income Inequality 
 
By the 1980s, prosperity and homogeneity had created the widespread perception that 
virtually every Japanese was middle class. However, subsequent fundamental economic 
and social transformations, combined with the unemployment and other adverse effects 
of poor economic performance, have led to a focus on the widening inequality of income 
distribution, an awareness of differences in lifestyles, and a newly articulated sense of 
unfairness between the wealthy and the poor. Opponents of free-market reforms are 
vigorously blaming Koizumi’s policies. This is surely too simplistic, and almost 
impossible to demonstrate. But it is true that, thus far, government policy has not done 
much to counter the increasing inequality. 
The government’s summer 2006 economic white paper addresses the income 
distribution issue. The Gini coefficient, the standard measure of income inequality, has 
been slightly rising in Japan ever since it was first officially estimated by the Ministry of 
Health, Labor, and Welfare in 1987. After adjusting for declining household size, the 
coefficient increased modestly, by 0.012, between 1989 and 2004. Between 1992 and 
2002, inequality in labor income increased in every age bracket. In Japan, as in all 
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countries, it is very difficult to estimate the income of the wealthy, there are other data 
difficulties, and there are substantial lags in data availability. 
An OECD study both documents Japan’s increasing income inequality and places 
it in comparative perspective with other advanced industrial countries based on data for 
2000, the latest available. The simple average of the Gini coefficients of OECD countries 
is 0.306. Japan, at 0.314, and five other countries are close to the average. The United 
States, at 0.357, has the highest observed inequalities; Denmark, with 0.225, has the most 
equal income distribution. 
 According to the OECD study, Japan’s Gini coefficient increased by 0.017 
between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, and a further 0.019 in the five years to 2000. 
Japan’s top fifth of the working-age population received 37.5 percent of disposable 
income, up 1.3 percentage points since 1995; the bottom fifth received 6.7 percent, down 
0.7 percentage points. 
 Two major causes of increasing income inequality have been labor market 
weaknesses and demographic changes. Wages of part-time and contract workers are 
significantly below those of regular full-time workers, and their share in employment has 
risen substantially. In Japan, unlike other countries, the unemployed are only about 10 
percent of the poor. 
The OECD study estimates that the disposable income of Japanese elderly 
households was 89.9 percent of the average in 2000, but the Gini coefficient is 
considerably higher for such households, and their share of the population is rising. 
Japanese 66 and older were 21.1 percent of the population in 2000, an increase of 5.1 
percentage points in five years. About 70 percent of Japan’s social welfare expenditures 
are for the elderly, about 4 percent for baby births and child rearing. The elderly hold 
their financial assets overwhelmingly in the form of deposits, which means for many 
years their interest income has been virtually zero. 
 Solving the financing of retired workers’ pensions and expanding health care, 
while restoring budget equilibrium, is a major challenge. However, these problems are 
widely understood by political leaders and government bureaucrats, as well as the 
Japanese public, so they will be resolved more readily than some of the other challenges 
Japan faces. The fundamental issue will be to determine what kind of welfare system 
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Japan wants, how large social welfare expenditure should be, and, accordingly, how 
much taxes will have to be raised as a share of GDP. 
 
 
5  Finance 
 
Banks continue to be the core of Japan’s financial system for both borrowers and savers, 
so bank performance is important both in its own right and as an indicator of the 
economy more broadly. The net profits of the six major bank groups soared to a record 
¥3.1 trillion ($27.0 billion) in the year to March 2006. That, however, exaggerates their 
fundamental strength. The banks did not pay any income taxes because they have large 
deferred tax credits (loss carry-forwards). Moreover, about a tenth of reported profits are 
from reducing loan loss reserves.  
This was possible because the nonperforming loan (NPL) problems of almost all 
banks were resolved by last year. NPL were only 1.8 percent of total loans for the major 
banks. While the NPL average for regional banks is 4.5 percent, the range is wide, and 
dangerously high for perhaps a dozen or so smaller banks. The major banks are now 
using profits to pay back the government capital received during the banking crisis. 
However, large-bank profitability is still low; the pre-tax return on assets in 2005 
was 0.84 percent, far below the 2.06 percent of major U.S. banks, though comparable to 
major banks in a number of continental European countries. A prime reason is that 
interest rate spreads on lending are still too narrow; they do not incorporate credit risk 
adequately. The spread for fifteen large Japanese banks was 1.07 percent, compared to 
2.65 percent for twelve U.S. banks. With relatively low core capital ratios, Japanese 
banks are not internationally competitive. Most foreign loans are to finance the activities 
of their Japanese multinational corporation clients. Moreover, the IT and financial 
technologies of most banks are not yet state of the art.  
 Following its outstanding performance through 2005 from its April 2003 trough, 
the stock market retreated 19 percent in the spring and summer of 2006 from its Nikkei 
index high of 17,563 on April 7 to its June 13 low before beginning to meander upward. 
With 2005’s run up, price-earnings ratios were high by international comparison, and 
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corporate profit growth is projected to slow somewhat this year. The shift to quality on 
international financial markets, in response to increasingly uncertain economic prospects, 
has been a negative factor. Foreign institutional purchases (and sales) continue to be 
important. By March’s end 2006 foreigners owned 26.7 percent of the Japanese stock 
market, up 3 percentage points from a year earlier and from 18.6 percent in 2000, a 
profound change from the 4.9 percent share in 1990. Japanese households, with huge 
savings in deposit form, have thus far been slow to purchase Japanese shares directly or 
through investment trusts (mutual funds). 
 The bond market provides important indicators of expectations about the 
economy’s future performance, particularly inflationary expectations. With short-term 
interest rates expected to rise, the yields on benchmark ten-year JGBs and other 
government securities have begun to rise but not very much, notable given the increased 
uncertainty. Since many financial institution holders of JGBs also hold Japanese equities, 
capital losses due to interest rate rises will be offset, in many cases more than fully, by 
good economic performance (and stock price increases) that justifies and indeed requires 
appropriate interest rate increases. 
 Hedge fund and private equity fund activity, though still modest, continues to 
develop. It involves Japanese financial institutions investing mainly in foreign alternative 
investment instruments, but gradually increasing in Japan as well. A relatively small 
number of dedicated foreign funds invest predominantly in Japan; that too is rising.  
Significant capital market imperfections persist despite real improvements over 
the past several years. The market for the junk bonds and higher-yield bank loans of less-
creditworthy large and medium firms remains underdeveloped. Capable credit-risk 
evaluation of SMEs is weak. For small firms and consumer finance, a key issue is 
whether the government will reduce the interest rate ceiling from 29.2 percent to 20.0 
percent, in legislation scheduled for this fall. While that is likely, also likely are 
exceptions for smaller loans, possibly with a ceiling higher than the level of most current 
loans, and a significant delay before the new regulations are implemented. 
A pro-market, prudential regulatory system, essential for financial market 
efficiency, continues to be put into place, though loopholes remain. Equally important is 
effective implementation of existing rules and regulations. 
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With the NPL problem behind it, the Financial Services Agency (FSA) has been 
able to turn to proactive reform of the financial system. The FSA has vigorously opened 
investigations, and has imposed business suspension, improvement orders, or other 
significant sanctions and penalties on leading firms throughout the sector. This includes 
both domestic and foreign firms and auditors (the Kanebo case), as well as fraudulent 
behavior scandals at specific companies such as the Livedoor and Murakami 
melodramas. The FSA is working to establish a rules-based system with accountability 
and transparency. One danger is that those supplying risk capital, Japanese and foreign, 
will be targeted, particularly in the media, as part of the backlash against still needed 
reforms. 
In addition to ongoing FSA activities, further reform of Japan’s financial 
institutions is both needed and, by and large, moving ahead. 
The Tokyo Stock Exchange, plagued by a series of embarrassing incidents 
revealing its technological inadequacies and inefficiencies, is committed to major 
investment in infrastructure so as to become world class. The Securities and Exchange 
Surveillance Commission (SESC), under the FSA, has been increasing staff to investigate 
securities violations, though it still needs considerably more professionals with requisite 
technical skills. It probably should become an independent government agency. 
Reform of government financial institutions (GFI) is moving ahead. 
Consolidation is underway, and two of the eight GFI will be privatized. Importantly, 
government (and Japan Post) provision of funding for these lending institutions will 
continue to decrease significantly. The great question marks for GFI reform are the 
specifics as to how Japan Post is privatized. 
 
 
6 Corporate Japan 
 
The corporate sector has changed dramatically in the past two decades. The traditional 
pillars of the postwar economic system are evolving: the permanent employment 
commitment is being narrowed to a smaller core of full-time regular employees; while 
still bank based, corporate finance relies more on capital markets and is more responsive 
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to their signals; and entrenched corporate management autonomy is weakened by new 
rules on transparency, disclosure, and modifications in corporate governance.  
 Most firms have engaged in restructuring, consolidation, and reduction of their 
work force by attrition and early retirement. With continued improvements in labor 
productivity and reduction in costs, firms have become quite profitable without 
significant increases in sales. Considerable consolidation and restructuring through 
friendly mergers negotiated directly between managements have taken place in major 
industries, notably steel, vehicles, paper and pulp, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, banks, and 
insurance companies. 
 Japan’s business system is even more rooted in long-term relationships than most 
other countries. While the economist’s abstract ideal may be spot markets, the important 
reality is that most business transactions are regularly repeated over extended periods of 
time. This is typically the case with the suppliers of inputs: workers, component parts 
makers, service providers, creditors. Sustained relationships require and engender trust, 
and under most circumstances are economically beneficial. When economic conditions 
significantly change however, so that resources need to be transferred to more efficient 
uses, binding relationships can become liabilities. Moreover, some relationships become 
too cozy, self serving, and even collusive.  
 Japan’s economy is in the long-run process of becoming more competitive and 
market oriented. Inefficient relationships are being eroded, even ended. The past fifteen 
years have seen many such cases of changing relationships: Nissan and its excess number 
of parts suppliers, banks continuing to lend to weak companies with nonperforming 
loans, the Ministry of Finance convoy system of financial institution regulation, 
government officials retiring into cushy corporate positions (amakudari), bank-client 
cross-shareholding, and the permanent employment system. Efficient and effective 
relationships will persist, but they will be more conditional, which means less strong and 






6.1 Corporate Governance 
 
Japan’s corporate governance system continues to evolve. Global convergence proceeds 
in terms of the overarching principles of transparency, disclosure, honesty, 
accountability, and responsibility. However, important specific differences in how these 
principles are interpreted and implemented persist in each country. Japan is considering 
legislation based on the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley law, referred to as J-Sox. The results of the 
debate will further shape the legal basis for corporate governance behavior.  
Japan will not wholeheartedly adopt an Anglo-Saxon model of corporate 
governance. The overwhelming majority of Japanese listed companies will continue to be 
controlled by entrenched management as members of the board of directors, even with 
the legal changes that mandate that a majority of the separate board of auditors must be 
outsiders. Relatively few companies will choose to use an American-type committee 
board system. For most listed companies, one or a few members of the board of directors 
will be from the outside, but they will not control the board. 
A major lesson of the past fifteen years is that good profits, if not actual profit 
maximization, are essential to all stakeholders – not just shareholders, but also 
management, employees, creditors, and suppliers. While management has certainly 
become much more responsive to company share prices and other shareholder interests, 
companies will continue to weigh heavily the interests of their regular, long-term 
employees, especially those on the management track. After all, these employees embody 
the technology and know-how essential to produce goods and services efficiently and 
competitively, and to sustain the management system over the longer run. 
The infamous thirty or so distressed large companies termed “zombies” have been 
resuscitated or otherwise dealt with. Nonetheless, many weak companies, both large and 
small, persist. They are still kept afloat by banks at interest rates completely unrelated to 
credit risk. Until July the prime rate was 1.375 percent. At the end of May 2006 loans and 
discounts with an interest rate less than 1.0 percent amounted to 27.7 percent of total 
bank loans, an increase from 20.0 percent in May 2002 when the economic recovery was 
beginning. Loans at less than 0.5 percent interest were 13.0 percent of the total, up from 
8.2 percent in 2002. The bank prime lending rate will surely continue to increase over the 
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next two years. Will these weak borrowers improve their businesses sufficiently to pay 
increasing loan charges? If not, will they go under, or will they continue to be kept alive 
by their banks, at increasing cost to bank profitability? 
Perhaps a more serious potential problem is how successful firms will behave. 
While managements have identified their company’s core competencies, they have not 
yet completed the process of divesting divisions or activities that are no longer central. 
Mergers and acquisitions involving outside players, though actually always friendly, are 
still relatively few; they will increase only gradually. 
Japan has yet to fully develop a hostile takeover bid (TOB) market. Though 
unsuccessful, Oji Paper’s hostile bid for Hokuetsu Paper this summer, also involving 
Nippon Paper Group and Mitsubishi Corporation, represents a significant qualitative 
change. Unlike the attempt by upstart Livedoor to take over Nippon Broadcasting in 
2005, this pitted large, long-established, traditional Japanese companies against each 
other. Many such companies now have ample cash; the TOB market may finally emerge 
in Japan. 
A real danger now is that managements will squander cash on new but 
unprofitable domestic investment projects. They should distribute substantially more 
profits to shareholders through dividend increases and share buybacks. However, 
managers want their empires to be larger. Such behavior in these good times would set 
back the still-incomplete process of allocating resources more efficiently. 
 
 
7 External Economic Relations 
 
Large current-account surpluses, achieved by significant increases in exports, have long 
played an important role in maintaining Japan’s aggregate demand, despite trade’s 
relatively small share in GDP. This reflects Japan’s manufacturing competitiveness, as 
well as surplus savings being lent abroad. In fiscal 2005, Japan’s current account surplus 
was a hefty 3.7 percent of GDP. The surplus is expected to persist for 2006 and narrow in 
2007 as export growth is projected to slow.  
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 Japan’s balance of payments position is being significantly influenced by two 
relatively new factors: its role as a creditor and the likely continued high level of oil 
prices. 
In 2005, Japan’s net surplus of ¥12.5 trillion ($109 billion) on its income 
account—interest and dividends—surpassed its trade surplus. Japan is a mature creditor 
country, the largest in the world. As a result of annual current account surpluses since 
1980, Japan is a global net creditor on the order of ¥184 trillion ($1.6 trillion). About half 
is in the form of government foreign exchange reserves. About 9 percent are the assets 
(undervalued in fact) of Japanese multinational foreign direct investments (FDI). 
Japanese FDI outflow in 2005 amounted to $46 billion, the highest since 1990; most was 
in the form of reinvested profits. In contrast, Japan continues to be a low recipient of FDI; 
the inflow of $2.8 billion in 2005 was below the $7.8 billion in 2004.  
Japan has to import essentially all its oil and natural gas. The world price went 
from $45 a barrel in fiscal 2004 to $60 in 2005, and may average $70 in fiscal 2006, 
despite the recent sharp decline of more than 20 percent to about $60. These movements 
have not yet seriously affected Japan’s CPI.  
The actual global supply-demand situation for oil is not clear, and the price has 
been subject to considerable volatility. In the short run, oil shocks significantly 
interrupting supply are accidents waiting to happen. And, given the course of human 
history, they probably will. Sustained oil price spikes are probably the single greatest 
economic threat to Japan and the world economy. Japan would be harmed mainly by the 
slowing of world growth, global inflationary pressures, and export slowdown if oil prices 
rise further. It can absorb the direct effects of its increased oil costs reasonably well. 
 I have been surprised by the yen’s weakness over the past year, given the 
economic fundamentals. However, the large and widening interest rate gap between yen 
and dollar financial assets has had a significant impact, generating huge net financial 
outflows from Japan. As the economy continues to improve and as Japanese interest rates 
rise while they level off in the United States, I expect the yen to appreciate somewhat 
against the dollar, but I am not sure how soon this will occur. That is quite aside from 
whether the dollar will decline significantly versus other currencies because of the huge 
U.S. current account deficit.  
 25
  
8 The Longer Run 
 
Japan’s two fundamental realities are that its population has peaked and will decline, and 
now that it has become a mature economy the long-run potential growth rate is not likely 
to be much more than 2 percent per capita at best. Consequently, Japan’s economic 
structure will profoundly change over the long run.  
Projections of Japan’s demographic transition indicate the population will decline 
slightly over the next five years or so (-0.1 percent annual rate), then more rapidly (-0.3 
percent) until 2020, and at a further -0.5 percent rate during the following 30 years. The 
population is projected to decrease to 121.1 million in 2025 from 127.7 million today, 
and to about 100 million in 2050. As context, the population was 94.8 million in 1960, 
including Okinawa. The share of the population 65 and older, now 20.6 percent, will rise 
to about 27.8 percent by 2020. Those 15 to 65, termed the working age population, will 
continue to decline annually about 0.7 percent until 2010, and then 1.1 percent until 2015.  
With decreasing supplies of workers, labor markets will be tight. Wages will be 
bid up, especially for 3D jobs (dirty, dangerous, difficult). Government pension and 
health care costs will rise as a share of GDP, and so, too, will revenues (taxes). Large-
scale immigration sufficient to maintain the labor force and the population is unlikely. At 
most, foreign contract guest workers will be tolerated in order to ameliorate labor 
shortages in 3D jobs and health care. It is possible that at some point in the distant future 
Japan’s total fertility rate, now only 1.25, will rise to the 2.1 sufficient to maintain a level 
population. For that, profound changes in values and behavior, as well as in institutions, 
will have to take place. 
As an advanced, high income, wealthy, mature economy with a sophisticated 
technological base, Japan’s potential GDP growth rate may be about 2 percent per capita. 
That has been the experience of other economies more or less at the global technology 
and productivity frontier. However since labor input will decrease, many argue the 
potential total GDP growth rate will be only about 1.5 percent. The key to Japan’s 
sustained growth will be continually improving labor productivity. That depends 
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fundamentally on technological innovations and their diffusion, enhanced education and 
training, and better capital (machinery, buildings, software) per worker. 
 Japan’s standard of living will double every thirty-six years if GDP per capita 
grows at 2 percent annually. Even if it only grows at 1 percent—slightly worse than its 
performance over the past fifteen years—the average standard of living will double in 
Japanese lifetimes. 
 Achieving Japan’s potential growth rate in the long run will not be automatic or 
easy. Probably the most important structural transformation the economy requires is to 
shift the growth engine from high saving, high investment, and high exports to domestic 
consumption-led growth. Japan’s saving and investment rates are wastefully high for an 
economy growing at 2 percent. Japan needs to invest less but more efficiently. 
The key to generating sufficient aggregate demand is consumption growth. The 
Japanese economy is too large to rely significantly on net export growth to be a major 
source of aggregate demand. Consumption will have to become a significantly larger 
share of GDP. To achieve that, wages and household incomes must rise, which they will 





To recapitulate, Japan is on a sustained growth path and, if growth continues well, will 
probably fully absorb remaining slack and achieve full employment growth within two 
years or so. As that takes place, financial markets will gradually return to normal. 
However, economic expansion may falter on its current path to sustained growth, though 
that is not very likely. Downside risks are greater than upside risks. 
I worry both about demand disappointments and supply shocks. My greatest near-
term concern is that Japan’s domestic demand effect of U.S. economic slowdown, which 
will reduce Japanese exports, will not be offset by a sufficient increase in domestic 
consumption. Inadequate aggregate demand has been Japan’s long-term problem which 
has not yet been fully resolved. I also worry that the policy definition of price stability 
will be too low, and that deflation will not really end soon. I suspect that the Abe 
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administration will not persist strongly in implementing economic reforms. And I 
continue to be wary of the global, and hence domestic, effects of oil price volatility and 
especially of continued high price levels. 
A major challenge for Japanese will be how to alter their mindsets. The postwar 
economic mindset, and the institutions supporting that mindset, has been buffeted by the 
economic failures of the past fifteen years as well as by Japan’s longer-run economic, 
political, and social transformations. To compete globally, Japan has to allocate resources 
more efficiently and effectively, and that requires major mindset changes. Established 
practices, modes of behavior, and rules of the game (social norms) will have to continue 
to adjust to today’s new realities. 
Many issues are yet to be resolved. How far should competitive forces and free 
market forces go? How, and to what degree, should the weak be protected and sustained? 
How can such goals be achieved more efficiently? Japan is neither an American 
Darwinian-type society nor a European welfare-state society. I think its middle-of-the-
road, rather egalitarian, commitments will persist.  
Japan is certainly not alone in the challenges it faces. It has many strengths that 
will enable it to do well. Japanese have attained a high educational level; workers are 
skilled, strongly motivated, and very productive. Its high capital/labor ratio will increase 
further. Japan’s technological level is outstanding and will continue to improve. Japan is 
a democracy, with strong rule of law. Compared to most other countries, the degree of 
corruption is low. It is a stable society; status differentiation is important, but a 
considerable egalitarian sense constrains inequalities. Japan will continue to be a major 
world player in the global economy, and certainly at least as successful in dealing with its 
problems as most other major advanced countries. 
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